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[L. A. No. 28903. In Bank. Oct. 30, 1967.] 
. LEE REICH, Individually and as Administrator, etc., et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JOSEPH PURCELL, De-
fendant and Respondent. 
[1] Con1lict of La.ws-La.w Governing Remedy: Torts.-In a com-
plex situation involving multi-statt' contacts, no single state 
alone can be deemed to create exclusively. governing rights. 
The forum must search to find the proper law to apply, based 
on the interests of the litigants and the involved states. 
[2] Id.-Torts.-In conflict cases, the law of the place of the 
wrong is not necessarily the applicable law for all tort actions 
brought in the courts of this state, and the ease of determin-
. ing applicable law and uniformity of rules of decision must he 
subordinated to the objective of proper choice of law, namely, 
. to determine the law that most appropriately applies to the 
issue involved (overruling Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 
366 [10 P.2d 63], Ryan v. North .Alaska SaZmon Co., 153 Cal. 
438 [95 P. 862] and other cases to the contrary). 
[3] Id.-Torts-Actions for Wrongful Death.-In a wrongful 
death action brought in California following an automobile 
accident in Missouri, defendant's liability should not be limit-
ed to the $25,000 maximum un(1er Missouri law, where Cali-
fornia had no interest in applyi~g its laws to plaintiffs, since 
they were domiciled in Ohio at the time of the accident, or to 
defendant, because, although he was domiciled in California, 
there was no statutory limitation of damages in California, 
and where the interests of Ohio, also without statutory limita-
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 79; Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of 
Laws, § 71. 
[3] Conflict of laws as to measure or amount of damages in 
death actions, note, 92 A.L.R.2d 1180. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict 
of Laws, § 82; Am.Jur.2d, Death, § 277. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Conflict of Laws, §§ 2, 13; [2] Con-
:ftict of Laws, § 13; [3] Conflict of Laws, § 14; Death, § 48. 
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552 REICH 11. PURCELL [67 C.2d 
tion, in affording full recovery to its domiciliaries did not 
conflict with any substantial interest in Missouri, in which 
none of the parties was domiciled . 
APPEAL from a portion of a judgment of the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County. Stevens Fargo, Judge. Re-
versed with directions. 
Action for wrongful death resulting from an automobile 
collision in another state. Portion of judgment awarding dam-
ages reversed with directions. 
Irell & Manella, Charles H. Phillips, Richard H. Borow and 
J. Gordon Hansen for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
John R. Allport for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRA Y'NOR, C. J.-This wrongful death action arose out of 
a h.ead-on collision of two automobiles in Missouri. One of the 
automobiles was owned and operated by defendant Joseph 
Purcell, a resident and domiciliary of California who was on 
his way to a vacation in Illinois. The. other automobile was 
owned and operated by Mrs. Reich, the wife of plaintiff Lee 
Reich.- T.he Reichs then resided in Ohio and Mrs. Reich and 
the Reichs' two children, Jay and Jeffry, were on their way 
to -California, where the Reichs were contemplating settling. 
Mrs. Reich and Jay were killed in the collision, and Jeffry 
was injured. 
Plaintiffs, Lee Reich and Jeffry Reich, are the heirs of Mrs. 
Reich and Lee Reich is the heir of Jay Reich. Plaintiffs moved 
to California and became permanent residents here after the 
accident. The estates of :Mrs. Reich and Jay Reich are being 
administered in Ohio. 
The parties stipulated that judgment be entered in specified 
amounts for the wrongful death of Jay, for the personal in-
juries suffered by Jeffry, and for the damages to Mrs. Reich's 
automobile. For the death of Mrs. Reich they stipulated that 
judgment be entered for $55,000 or $25,000 depending· on the 
court's ruling on t.he applicability of the Missouri limitation 
of damages to a maximum of $25,000. (Vernon's Ann. Mo. 
Stats. § 537.090.)1 Neither Ohio nor California limit recovery 
l.Amo-unt of damages recoverable. "In every action brought under sec-
tion 537.080 [action for wrongful death], the jury may give to the sur-
viving party or parties who may be entitled to sue such damages, not 
exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, as the jury may deem fair and 
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in wrongful death actions.2 The trial court held that the Mis-
souri limitation applied because the accident occurred there 
and entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appeal. 
For many years courts applied the law of the place of the 
wrong in tort actions regardless of the issues before the court, 
e.g., whether they involved conduct, survival of actions, ap-
plicability of a wrongful death statute, immunity from liabil-
ity, or other rules determining whether a legal injury has 
been sustained. (See Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366 
[10 P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. 1264] ; Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon 
Co., 153 Cal. 438, 439 [95 P. 862] ; Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 378 
et seq.) It was assumed that the law of the place of the wrong 
created the cause of action and necessarily detennined the 
extent of the liability (Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R. Co., 194 
U.S. 120, 126 [48 L.Ed. 900, 902, 24 8.Ct. 581].) Aside from 
procedural difficulties (see Currie, Selected Essays on Conflict 
of Laws (1963) pp. 10-18), this theory worked well enough 
when all the relevant events took place in one jurisdiction, but 
the action was brought in another. [1] In a complex situa-
tion involving multi-state contacts, however, no single state 
alone can be deemed to create exclusively governing rights. 
(Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 42 [13 L.Ed.2d 641, 
643, 85 8.Ct. 769] ; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.8. 179, 
181-182 [12 L.Ed.2d 229, 231, 84 S.Ct. 1197] ; Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Cfnp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 [99 L.Ed. 74, 81-82, 75 
8. Ct. 166].) The forum must search to find the proper law to 
apply based upon the interests of the litigants and the in-
volved states. Such complex cases elucidate what the simpler 
cases obscured, namely, that the forum can only apply its own 
law. (See Lein v. Parkin, 49 Ca1.2d 397 [318 P.2d 1] ; Grant 
v. McAulzffe, 41 Cal.2d 859 [264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162J ; 
W. W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of Conflict of Laws 
(1942) pp. 20-21; Cavers, Two" Local Law" The01'ies, 63 
Harv. L. Rev. 822-824.) When it purports to do otherwise, it 
is not enforcing foreign rights but choosing a foreign rule of 
decision as the appropriate one to apply to the case before it. 
just for the death and loss thus occasioned, with reference to the neces-
sary injury resulting from such death, and having regard for mitigating 
or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault resulting in such death. . . ." 
20hio Constitution, article I, section 19a: "The amount of damages 
recoverable by civil action in the courts for death caused by wrongful 
act, neglect or default of another, shall not be limited by law." California 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 377: "In every action under this sec-
tion. such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the 
ease. may be just. • . ." 
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Moreover, it has now been demonstrated that a choice of law 
resulting from a hopeless search for a governing foreign law 
to create a foreign vested right may defeat the legitimate 
interests of the litigants and the states involved. (See, general-
ly, Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (1965) ; Currie, Select-
ed Essays on. Conflict of Laws, supra; Ehrenzweig, Conflict of 
Laws (1962).) 
Accordingly, when application of the law of the place of the 
wrong would defeat the interests of the litigants and of the 
states concerned, we have not applied that law. (Grant v. 
McAuliffe, supra, 41 Ca1.2d 859, 867; Emery v. Emery, 45 
Ca1.2d 421, 428 [289 P.2d 218].) Grant was an action for 
personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident in 
Arizona between California residents. The driver whose negli-
gence caused the accident died, and the court had to choose 
between the California rule that allowed an action against the 
personal representative and the Arizona rule that did not. We 
held that since "all of the parties were residents of this state, 
and the estate of the deceased tortfeasor is being administered 
in this state, plaintiffs' right to prosecute their causes of ac-
tion is governed by the laws of this state relating to adminis-
tration ot estates." Under these circumstances application of 
the law of the place of the wrong would not only have de-
feated California's interest and that of its residents but 
would have advanced no interest of Arizona or its residents. 
(Grant v. McAuliffe, supra, 41 Cal.2d at 867.) In Emery 
members of a California family were injured in Idaho when 
another member of the family who was driving lost control of 
the car and it went off the road. The question was whether 
Idaho or California law determined when one member of a 
family was immune from tort liability to another. We applied 
the law of the family domicile rather than the law of the place 
of the wrong. "That state has the primary responsibility for 
establishing and regUlating the incidents of the family rela-
tionship and it is t.he only state in which the parties can, by 
participation in the legislative processes, effect a change in 
those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, 
duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by 
the family relationship should constantly change as members 
of the family cross state boundaries. during temporary ab-
sences from their home. ,! (45 Cal.2d at p. 428.) 
Defendant contends, however, that there were compelling 
reasons in the Grfllnt and Emery cases for departing from the 
law of the place of the wrong and that such reasons are not 
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present in this case. He urges that application of that law 
promotes uniformity of decisions, prevents forum shopping, 
and avoids the uncertainties that may result from ad hoc 
searches for a more appropriate law in this and similar cases. 
[2] Ease of determining applicable law and uniformity 
of rules of decision, however, must be subordinated to the 
objective of proper choice of law in conflict cases, i.e., to 
de~rmine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue 
involved (see LeBar, Choice-Influencing Considerations In 
Conflicts Law (1966) 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267, 279-282). More-
over, as jurisdiction after jurisdiction has departed from the 
law of the place of the wrong as the controlling law in tort 
cases, regardless of the issue involved (see Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal, Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381-384 [3 L.Ed. 
2d 368, 387-389, 79 S.Ct. 468] [Admiralty]; Wartell v. For-
musa (1966) 34 Ill.2d 57 [213 N.E.2d 544]; W. H. Barber 
Co. v. Hughes (1945) 223 Ind. 570 [63 N.E.2d 417]; Wessling 
v. Paris (Ky.App. 1967) 417 S.W.2d 259; Clark v. Clark 
(1966) 107 N.H. 351 [222 A.2d 205] ; Babcock v. Jackson, 12 
N.Y.2d 473 [191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1] ; Casey v. Man-
son Constr. &- Engineering Co. (1967) -- Ore. -- [428 
P.2d 898] ; G'rijJith v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1964) 416 Pa. 1 
[203 A.2d 796] ; Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 
2d 130 [95 N.W.2d 814]), that law no longer affords even a 
semblance of the general applicat.ion that was once thought to 
be its great virtue. We conclude that the law of the place of 
the wrong is not necessarily the applicable law for all tort 
actions brought in the courts of this state. Loranger v. Na-
deau, Sll-pra, 215 Cal. 362, 366; Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon 
Co., supra, 153 Cal. 438, and other cases to the contrary are 
overruled. 
[8] As the forum we must consider all of the foreign and 
domestic elements and interests involved in this case to deter-
mine the rule applicable. Three states are involved. Ohio is 
where plaintiffs and their decedents resided before the acci-
dent and where the decedents' estates are being administered. 
Missouri is the place of the wrong. California is the place 
where defendant resides and is the forum. Although plaintiffs 
now reside in California, their residence and domicile at the 
time of the accident are the relevant residence and domicile. 
At the time of the accident the plans to change the family 
domicile were not definite and fixed, and if t.he choice of law 
were made to turn on events happening after the accident, 
forum shopping would be encouraged. (See Cavers, ~. cit., 
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supra, p. 151, fn. 16.) Accordingly, plaintiffs' present domi-
cile in California does not give this state any interest in apply-
ing its law, and since California has no limitation of damages, 
it also has no interest in applying its law on behalf of defend-
ant. As a forum that is therefore disinterested in the only 
issue in dispute, we must decide whether to adopt the Ohio or 
the Missouri rule as the rule of decision for this case. 
Missouri is concerned with conduct within her borders and 
as to such conduct she has the predominant interest of the 
states involved. Limitations of jamages for wrongful death, 
however, llave little or nothing to do with conduct. They are 
concerned not with how people should behave but with how 
survivors should be compensated. The state of the place of the 
wrong has little or no interest in such compensation when 
none of the parties reside there. Wrongful death statutes cre-
ate causes. of action in specified beneficiaries and distribute 
the proceeds to those beneficiaries. The proceeds in the hands 
of the beneficiaries are not distributed through the decedent's 
estate and, therefore, arc not subject to the claims of the 
decedent's creditors and consequently do not provide a fund 
for local creditors. Accordingly, the interest of a state in a 
wrongful death action insofar as plaintiffs are concerned is in 
determining the distribution of proceeds to the beneficiaries 
and that interest extends only to loeal decedents and benefi-
ciaries. (Currie, OPe cit., supra, pp. 690,702.) Missouri's limi-
tation on damages expresses an additional concern for defend-
ants, however, in that it operates to avoid the imposition of 
excessive financial burdens on them. That concern is 
also primarily local and we fail to perceive any substan-
tial interest Missouri mig}lt have in extending the benefits 
of its limitation of damages to travelers from states having no 
similar limitation. Defendant's liability should not be limited 
when no party to the action is from a state limiting liability 
and when defendant, therefore, would have secured insurance, 
if any, without any such limit in mind. A defendant cannot 
reasonably complain when compensatory damages are assessed 
in accordance with the law of his domicile and plaintiffs re-
ceive no more than they would had they been injured at home. 
(See Cavers, Ope cit., supra, pp. 153-157.) Under these circum-
stances giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full re-
covery to injured parties does not conflict with any substan-
tial interest of Missouri. (Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Ca1.2d 
588, 595 [12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906].) Accordingly, the 
Missouri limitation does not apply. (Accord: Gianni V. Fort 
----~ 
-) 
Wayne Air Service, Inc. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 621; Watts 
V. Pioneer Corn Co. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 617; Pearson V. 
Northeast Airlines, Inc. (2d Cir. 1962) 309 F.2d 553, 92 
A.L.R.2d 1162; Fabricius v. IIorgen (1965) 257 Iowa 268 
[132 N.\V.2d 410] ; Farber V. Smolack (N.Y. 1967) 36 U.S.L. 
Week 2075; Long V. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 
(1965) 16 N.Y.2d 337 [213 N.E.2d 796] ; Kilberg v. Northeast 
Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34 [172 N.E.2d 526] j Griffith V. 
United Air Lines, Inc., supra, 416 Pa. 1.) 
The part of the judgment appealed from is reversed with 
directions to the trial court to enter judgment for the plain-
tiffs in the amount of $55,000 in accordance with the stipula-
tions of the parties. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J.} Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
On November 29, 1967, the opinion was modified to read 
as printed above. 
